Introduction
There are a number of diverse research topics and an abundance of research concerning the Jiangnan region, which saw rapid economic growth compared to other areas since the Song Dynasty. Such plentiful research is gradually expanding into a discourse on examining the meaning of economic development and transformation in the Jiangnan region during the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Yet on the other hand, there are efforts to look to the Jiangnan region during the Ming and Qing Dynasties to find the driving force for China's rapid economic development today. 1 This shows that the significance of economic transformation that took place in the Jiangnan region since the Song Dynasty to this day can be translated into many different ways, and there is a lot of information to be reconsidered and reexamined. In this aspect, the issue of hydraulic engineering in the Jiangnan region during the Ming and Qing Dynasties is not an exception to this trend. Karl A. Wittfogel's argument that the construction of large-scale water control facilities was possible through an absolutist regime in premodern Asian society 2 is no longer valid. However, Mark Elvin's study asserts that
Chinese society was subjected to a "technological lock-in" due to the great burden placed on society in terms of labor and materials for the construction and maintenance of hydraulic facilities. This reminds us that Wittfogel's thesis, in which he defined Chinese society as a hydraulic society, was not completely unfounded. 3 Furthermore, Elvin's argument poses a potent question the existing studies that emphasize the expansion of hydraulic facilities as an important precursor for the development of agricultural productivity. Therefore we now have an opportunity for a series of research to reexamine the significance of the issue of hydraulics in the Jiangnan region during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, despite existing research on the topic. In this paper, I would like to make two main points. First, I will examine how the two major goals of the Chinese hydraulic engineering projects-the concepts of "flood control (治水)" and "irrigation (治田)"-were developed and transformed over time. "Flood control" is a concept of responding to natural disasters, such as floods, while "irrigation" focuses on the use of water. As a result, dredging was important in achieving flood control, while the link between reservoirs and streams was important in irrigation. These two types of hydraulic engineering projects were not opposing concepts. However, bureaucrats of the Ming and Qing Dynasties often believed the two different types of projects were based on conflicting concepts and had different purposes. Therefore, exploring the differences between the two concepts would allow us to fathom the way in which Ming Dynasty and Qing Dynasty bureaucrats understood hydraulics.
Second, this paper will trace the changes in the understanding of hydraulics in accordance with the changes in socio-economic conditions. The same type of hydraulic engineering projects were repeatedly carried out in the Jiangnan region. We can assume that the fundamental goals of hydraulic engineering projects were generally the same. Yet, there were different perspectives regarding the function of hydraulic facilities in commercial farming areas. Therefore repeated implementation of hydraulic engineering projects with the same goals and the rise of a new concept of irrigation in line with the socio-economic changes since the sixteenth century are two characteristics of hydraulics specific to the Jiangnan region. By highlighting these two trends, it will be possible to deduce how bureaucrats and commoners thought about the significance of hydraulic facilities. This study is particularly important since existing research tends to limit the issue of hydraulics excessively to rice farming. This paper will focus on the time period between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Considering the fact that foreign invasions as well as the transformation of the Chinese society following unprecedented growth occurred between the end of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth century, the nineteenth century can be seen as a turning point of history. Along with these internal and external changes, this paper also takes into consideration existing research that argues that efforts for land improvement in the Jiangnan region had been completed in the midnineteenth century. 4 Meanwhile, this paper also attempts to redefine the sixteenth century, shying away from the existing trend of research on the4 Ming and Qing Dynasties, which focus on the period of transition from the Ming Dynasty to the Qing. 5 The most crucial changes that occurred in the sixteenth century, including the increase of areas to cultivate raw cotton and mulberry trees, and the appearance of the cotton industry and the silk industry, were the most prevalent in the Jiangnan region. It is also important to understand that aside from these socio-economic changes, large-scale hydraulic engineering projects began to take place in full force in the sixteenth century due to the deterioration of hydraulic facilities. Lastly, I would like to mention some of the historical documents that have been consulted for this study. Due to the size of the economy and the importance of hydraulics in the Jiangnan region, there were numerous local gazetteers (地方志) and records of hydraulic technology (水利志) compared to other regions. These were the main historical sources used in this study. Moreover, Collected Writings on Statecraft of the Ming Dynasty (明經世文編) and Collected Writings on Statecraft of the Reigning Dynasty (皇朝經世文編), published in the Ming and the Qing Dynasties respectively, were also used as references. Through the Collected Writings on Statecraft, which are important historical materials on the Ming and the Qing Dynasties, it is possible to identify the problems the two dynasties confronted and to deduce the bureaucrats' ideas and thoughts on the issue of hydraulics. 
Hydraulic Engineering Projects along the Wusong River Basin during the Ming Dynasty
In his study, Shiba Yoshinobu argues that the development of water control facilities began in the southern region of Jiangnan and expanded to the eastern region. His argument is still strongly supported by numerous scholars. Moreover, he pointed out that 1) hydraulic engineering projects in the Jiangnan region during the Song Dynasty had been concentrated on the Qiantang River (錢塘江) system and the southern coast of Hangzhou Bay, and 2) the number of projects along the Wusong River Basin was very small. 6 On the premise that the stagnation of seawater increased as a result of the natural formation of low hills and weakened drainability of the Wusong River from building a canal, he also mentioned that the construction of dykes along the coast to prevent the inflow of seawater was completed at the end of the Song Dynasty. 7 Then what were the circumstances surrounding hydraulics along the Wusong River Basin during the Ming Dynasty, which were not explored in depth in Yoshinobu's research? Dredging became an important issue in the Wusong River area due to geographical reasons, as the water from Lake Taihu flowed into the Wusong River, and farmlands were formed in the area. 8 of the 96 hydraulic engineering projects that took place in Suzhou from the Yongle Era to the end of the Chongzhen Era involved dredging. 18 It would be impossible to explain the significance and the process of discussion surrounding the 96 hydraulic engineering projects that took place in the Wusong River area throughout the Ming Dynasty, but it would be possible to gain a crucial understanding of hydraulic policies along the Wusong River and the Jiangnan region through the records of the bureaucrats at the time. Regardless of the time, the ideal of hydraulics lay in the improvement of agricultural productivity, 19 hydraulics for farmland would naturally be resolved through the dredging of the Wusong River. 21 Hydraulic theories that Chinese bureaucrats proposed at the time included both flood control and irrigation. Let's take a deeper look into the reasoning asserted by Lü Guangxun (呂光洵, 1508-1580).
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Lü Guangxun emphasized the importance of hydraulic facilities by stating that Suzhou and Songjiang prefectures account for a third of economic wealth of China. Then he identified the key factors in hydraulic facilities in the Suzhou area: 1) Dredging for better water circulation, 2) repairing the embankment to guarantee horizontal flow, 3) building a sluice gate to prevent landslides, 4) using the budget for water control based on the urgency of matters, and 5) establishing an official position to take charge of hydraulics. Specific explanation Lü added to justify the five points he made contains crucial information that shows the status of hydraulics in the Suzhou area at the time.
First, he emphasized the fact that there was sediment buildup in about 100 places in the upstream and downstream sections of the Wusong River. Then he asserted that the water from Lake Taihu needed to flow into Yangcheng (陽城) Lake, Kuncheng (昆承) Lake, and Sanmao (三泖) Lake. He also pointed out that water from Dianshan Lake should flow into the sea by dredging along the Wusong River. This was not different from the hydraulic engineering projects that Xia Yuanji had carried out. Moreover, the fact that Lü stressed the dredging of small streams that flow through farmlands shows how not only the main rivers but even small streams that irrigated the farmlands experienced severe sediment accumulation.
Believing that irrigation was at the root of flood control, Lü stated that the deterioration of the embankment was worse than 20 or 30 years ago. As a result, he claimed that if farmers can build the embankment during the off-farming season, they can naturally protect the farmland. He also made an argument for building a sluice gate to block off the seawater. Lü Guangxun's assertion is important because ironically the same argument was generally made throughout different regions in China during the Ming and Qing Dynasties. This commonality is also clearly related to the ideals that lie behind the hydraulic engineering projects. Lü pointed out that urgent projects must be carried out prior to less pressing projects, as it will lessen the burden on the people and help secure the budget for the projects. He believed that carrying out hydraulic engineering projects all at once not only depleted the budget for construction but also left most projects unfinished. His remarks were targeted at projects such as large-scale dredging. 23 However, from the fact that Hai Rui (海瑞, 1514-1587) carried out a dredging project along the 70 li of the Wusong River Basin in the fourth year of Emperor Longqing (CE 1570), it is possible to see how urgent it was, when it should have been carried out a long-term plan. Furthermore, when natural disasters occurred, local officials who were worried about rising prices and shortage of grains in their jurisdiction refused to sell grains to the disaster areas. As a result, the disaster areas faced a double challenge of providing relief to its people and starting hydraulic engineering projects. 24 The fact that hydraulic engineering projects were carried out in dire and pressing situations can also be confirmed by Xu Xianqing (徐顯卿, 1537-1602). He claimed that dredging projects were carried out whenever necessary to resolve the problem at hand without implementing a lasting measure (每因時疏濬, 以救目前). In Xu Xianqing's statement, it is important to note that once again the water flow in the Wusong River was blocked by sediment buildup.
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As we can see from the assertions put forth by Lü Guangxun, Hai Rui, and Xu Xianqing, flood control projects during the mid-Ming Dynasty were ineffective at best. Starting in the Hongzhi Era, the Wusong River area was left congested afterwards. 26 If the goal of flood control lay in recovering the old waterways of the Wusong River area as Jia Dan argued, the reality shows that hydraulic policies in sixteenth century Ming China was faced with an obvious limitation.
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When hydraulic policies for the Wusong River area, where streams, lakes, and the ocean can be found in close proximity, reached the breaking point, some people became interested in designing provisional hydraulic engineering projects to remedy the issue temporarily. One such individual was Yan Na (嚴訥, 1511-1584), who emphasized small-scale dredging instead of large-scale dredging that had been performed in the past. 28 Adding to this argument, Xu Jie (徐階, 1503-1583) defined the basics of flood control as "water reservoir" and "drainage." He further elaborated that "large-scale" projects involve diverting the water from the Baimao River and the Wusong River to the sea, while "small-scale" projects focus on the inflow of water from the Baimao River and the Wusong River to the farmland. He then asserted that hydraulic engineering projects are more advantageous on a small scale as largescale dredging not only requires high costs but is also difficult to start at once.
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In fact, some of the bureaucrats claimed that if stagnant water can start flowing again by dredging the reservoir, it would be possible to drain water in case of floods and supply water in case of droughts. In addition, they commented that waterways for farmlands should be dredged by landlords. 30 As these accounts reveal, the concept of irrigation was formed as a way to reconcile the failure of flood control. In this aspect, the fact that emperors and bureaucrats of the Ming Dynasty did not make hasty decisions on large-scale hydraulic engineering projects 31 is an important lead for reexamining the traditional concept of hydraulics in not only the Ming Dynasty but throughout Chinese history. The most difficult problem in hydraulic engineering projects was the procurement of funding. Besides the worsening overall condition of the hydraulic system, expenses for hydraulic engineering projects rose as they involved merging small streams and tributaries together to form larger rivers. These artificial rivers were created to simplify the dredging process and particularly to improve water storability by increasing the size of the body of water within the embankment. However, due to the difficulties in allocating manpower and mobilizing financial resources for the project, it was impossible to achieve the ultimate goal of these projects. 32 Then how much was spent on a series of such hydraulic engineering projects? In the project to dredge about 1.8 kilometers, or 6,336 zhang, along the Wusong River during the Jiajing Era, a total of 43,000 workers were mobilized, and 13,395 taels of silver and 25,332 dan of rice were spent on the laborers. 33 The total number of laborers involved in the dredging of the Baimao River under the direction of Hai Rui, following the dredging project along the Wusong River, was 1,649,536, and they were paid 41,238 taels of silver. 34 Therefore a huge amount of money had to be spent in hydraulic engineering projects, but these projects only helped the bodies of water return to their previous condition (獲利如故). 35 Moreover, in most of the projects, bureaucrats often neglected the public nature of the hydraulic system, pursuing their own personal gains (背公營私 increase the wealth of the region. 40 There are no specific historical records about the opinions of bureaucrats regarding such circumstances in late Ming Dynasty. However, the situations clearly show that it was no longer possible to carry out hydraulic engineering projects that were planned from the perspective of pure hydraulics. 41 As a result, in the late sixteenth century, the bureaucrats were unable to control the peasants from creating lake fields and secretly discharging water for irrigation, or the fishermen from opening sluice gates and casting their nets. Still, they did nothing more than argue that it is best for the people to voluntarily protect and operate hydraulic facilities. 42 Hydraulic engineering projects during the Ming Dynasty were often large-scale dredging projects to improve drainage, but their effects were very limited. As a result, the argument for irrigation projects that are practically necessary for farming, instead of flood control projects that take the whole hydraulic system into consideration, began to form in the mid-to late Ming Dynasty. However, as we can tell from the figures Zhao Yongxian mentioned, small-scale projects on the regional level were also 40 As a result, officials at the time mentioned that the actual production of Suzhou Prefecture may be different from its reputation as a wealthy area. 
Commercial Cultivation and the Transformation of the Concept of Hydraulics in the Qing Dynasty
The Qing Dynasty had no choice but to inherit the failed legacy of the Ming Dynasty. Therefore intellectuals during the transition period from the Ming to the Qing had an accurate understanding of the grave hydraulic situation in Suzhou. 44 For instance, Gu Yanwu (顧炎武, 1613-1682) explained that "Land has formed in this area due to lake waters that intruded this area without any intervention in the past few decades, and all the farmland along the stream have dried up." He added that there is no government official in charge of hydraulics and criticized the bureaucrats 43 This part needs to be researched further using documents that are similar to the local gazetteers and records of water conservancy published during the Ming Dynasty, and Collected Writings on Statecraft from the two dynasties, which has not been properly studied. Therefore the statement above can be provisional. for shifting all the responsibility onto the people through forced labor for hydraulic engineering projects instead of devising practical measures for the problem. 45 In addition to Gu Yanwu's point, arguments for hydraulic engineering projects, suitable for the newly formed landscape that had already surfaced in the sixteenth century, frequently appeared in the Qing Dynasty as well. Many argued that since the Wusong River area was devoid of a river, there was no need for a large-scale restoration project (不必復舊時之大觀). 46 Yet on the other hand, the assertion that appropriate connections among the Three Rivers was the key to preventing floods in the Suzhou and Songjiang region persisted throughout the Qing Dynasty. 47 In fully grasped the fundamental nature of problems related to hydraulic engineering projects, yet the situation surrounding hydraulics in the Suzhou area still was not improved even until the nineteenth century.
A more detailed study is required to fathom the reason for the lack of effective measures for hydraulics during the Ming and Qing Dynasties in spite of the fact that the intellectuals and bureaucrats at the time had a clear understanding of hydraulic problems in this area. 49 A different argument that surfaced in the Qing Dynasty was an argument for the division of water dynamics (分勢). 50 Of course, the division argument was also criticized for the immense expense it called for. However, during the Shunzhi Era, Xu Xudan (徐旭旦) asserted that the main purpose of the division of water dynamics was to dredge river mouths without having to restore the old channels of the Three Rivers. Moreover, Xu argued that it would be more effective to prevent the accumulation of sediment in lakes that have not been blocked instead of restoring lakes that have been blocked. 51 His argument was based on the fact that it is impossible to restore existing waterways in effect and that it is more advantageous in terms of hydraulics to follow the trend at the time. Meanwhile, the issue of the cost of hydraulic engineering projects was still not resolved in the Qing Dynasty. Particularly in the early Qing Dynasty when the administration and the lives of the people had not yet been stabilized, the cost of large-scale hydraulic engineering projects was heavily reliant on donations of potentates. This is exemplified by Mu  Tianyan (慕天顔, 1624-1696) , who emphasized that the cost to expand water control facilities have to depend on contributions during the Kangxi Era. 52 Mu also asserted that main rivers can be dredged using government funds, but the funds for repairing reservoirs need to be delegated to the people as it was difficult to procure them. As such, even in the Qing Dynasty, dredging of main waterways was emphasized while there was a considerable challenge in procuring the funding for hydraulic engineering projects. This is well reflected in a stele made during the Daoguang Era, which is an important historical source about the hydraulics of the Wusong River. 53 The inscription begins with the emperor's edict in the fifth year of Emperor Daoguang's reign (CE 1825) and contains information about large-scale hydraulic engineering projects performed between the seventh and seventeenth years of Daoguang Era (1827-1837). 54 According to the stele, the original purpose of the project was to dredge all of the Wusong River, but only the Huangpu River was dredged during the project. The sediment buildup had worsened to the point that the area surrounding the river mouths had been turned into land, and only a trickle of water flowed in the downstream section of the river. In the end, the government decided to dredge the river when necessary and dispatched an official to identify the main waterways and reservoirs that required dredging operations. Therefore, we can see that the projects were carried out in a different way than it was originally intended.
Most of the inscription of the stele is related to the procurement of resources, and it shows the difficulty in appropriating the expenses for hydraulic engineering projects even in the mid-Qing Dynasty. Of the total cost for the projects, 265,732 taels were appropriated from the national treasury, but the shortage of 33,000 taels as well as future funding were to be procured by selling degrees and ranks in local governments on the prefecture and county levels. This is a reflection of the fact that the hydraulics issue was not improved at all even during the Qing Dynasty, leading to the continuation of the situation in which social capital for hydraulic engineering projects always had to be stocked up, as Mark Elvin pointed out in his study.
The situation regarding hydraulic engineering projects in the Qing Dynasty was not different from that of the Ming Dynasty. When comparing the historical documents from the two dynasties, it is difficult to find any evidence for the change in the fundamental concept of flood control in the Qing Dynasty compared to the Ming Dynasty. As a result, it is easy to find statements, such as: "When we have good hydraulics, we can prepare for droughts and floods. We will be able to collect enough land tax and stock up on plenty of rice and grains. On the other hand, if we do not prepare for floods or droughts, famine will come without warning. Then we will be unable to collect land taxes or provide relief for 與環境硏究): 335-347. the suffering people. Therefore it is clear which will be profitable and which will be harmful. All of this is not simply dependent on the will of the heavens but lies in men." 55 The author of the above statement added, "When we value hydraulics, we can enrich the foundation of land taxes." 55 However, we can see that the basic idea of the Chinese people--hydraulics as the basis of land taxes--went through a huge transformation starting in the sixteenth century in the Jiangnan region, with the decrease in the size of land for rice farming following the expansion of commercial crops, increased population, and urbanization. Since it is difficult to determine an accurate count of population of all of China in the Ming Dynasty, it is hard to calculate the rate of population increase in the Jiangnan region from the Ming Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty. Unlike the previous studies, there are arguments that the population pressure in the Jiangnan region during the Qing Dynasty was not as high, 56 but the fact that the Jiangnan region had been overpopulated compared to the size of farmlands in the Qing Dynasty is evidenced by a number of sources.
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Therefore not only the purpose of increasing the land tax but also the production of food for each and every farmer gained heightened interest. 58 One of the typical arguments can be found in the writing of Jin Fu (靳輔, 58 Regarding this problem, it is important to examine whether the existing research results--that the Chinese government exercised superior and effective power for the distribution of food during the food shortage crisis in the eighteenth century--were also applied to the food production through proactive improvement of water control facilities. Regarding efficient food distribution by the government, refer to Pierre-Etienne Will, "The State, the Public Sphere, and the Redistribution of Food during the Qing Period" (L'Etat, la sphère publique et la redistribution des 1633-1692). He attempted to expand the hydraulic facilities to increase the capacity for supporting the population. He argued, "One able-bodied man can farm 12 to 13 mu of rice paddies. Fertile land of that size can produce 30 dan of rice, while less fertile land can produce 20 dan.
Assuming that one person eats 1 sheng of rice, it is possible to feed 9 people with 30 dan of rice, and 5 or 6 people with 20 dan." 59 Jin Fu went into the details about the amount of rice consumption because he believed that there were many more consumers than producers. At the time, he was interested in the situation of the northern part of Jiangnan. He asserted that the previous hydraulic engineering projects were only carried out in an attempt to minimize the damage instead of focusing on increasing the profit. Jin Fu believed that the issue of hydraulics lay in self-reliance (自 食其力), or in other words, creating the foundation to resolve the food problem through self-reliance. 60 Meanwhile, the expansion of commercial crop cultivation served as a momentum to change the existing concept of hydraulics. In this regard, records of Qin Shan (欽善), known to have lived during the Jiaqing Era, is quite intriguing. One of the reasons for expanding commercial cultivation was probably people's obsession with money. This was one of the factors that caused the transformation of numerous efforts put into the hydraulic facilities. In Qin Shan's statement, which was made in a conversation, he refuted the argument that "Growing raw cotton and rice at the same time results in the lack of rice production and degradation of soil, and it is harmful for the farmers since a hundred cotton plants can be exchanged with only 2 dan of rice" by asserting that both money and grains are important. He explained that if people have money, they do not need to worry about food. Rather, they can use the money for other consumptions, and therefore having money is much more convenient. He affirmed that giving up rice farming to plant cotton was not the worst plan.
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Qin Shan's point is in exact accordance with the transformation of agriculture in the Wusong River area. In fact, cotton has high tolerance for drought, and as a result, it is possible to cultivate cotton regardless of the water level in soil as long as it is fertile enough. 62 Therefore cotton was produced mainly in hilly and mountainous areas, where there was a lack of irrigation facilities. Particularly, since the mid-Ming Dynasty, cotton production was expanded from the region east of the so-called hill range that connects Changshu and Fengxian in the middle to the south of the hill range. 63 In addition, the trend of increasing cotton production in the Qing Dynasty is also reflected in the memorial written by Gao Jin (高 晉, 1707-1778) in the 14th year of Emperor Qianlong's reign (1749).
According to Gao, rice paddies accounted for only about 20 to 30 percent of farmlands in the Songjiang, Taicang, and Tongzhou area, and the rest was cotton fields. 64 Gao explained that this was not only because cotton cultivation is more profitable but also because the tributaries had been blocked, making it difficult to operate water wheels, raising the cost for rice farming. In this way, the people's interest in hydraulic facilities decreased due to the rise in the production of cotton in certain regions. Moreover, as the variety of crops for cultivation increased, there were cases, in which the peasants disregarded their landlords' intention to grow rice and planted cotton instead. Landlords also were not keen on starting hydraulic engineering projects, due to the high costs. 65 This shows that the change in the economy of the Jiangnan region transformed the people's perspectives on hydraulics. Just as Zhang Ying (張英, 1637-1708) argued for people to change their opinions regarding land assets, 66 farmers and intellectuals came to be interested in profitability of improving hydraulic facilities, rather than simply focusing on the production of grains. Surprisingly, Qin Shan had an optimistic view regarding the hydraulics situation in Suzhou. To the argument that farmers no longer had the capacity that year to farm due to the damage from floods in the ninth and thirteenth years of Emperor Jiaqing's reign (CE 1804 and 1808), Qin Shan explained that the heavens must be lightening the burden on the Jiangnan region, since the tide has turned its direction towards Zhejiang Province, and the sand was blocked outside of Chongque (漴闕) in Huating (華亭) County from flowing into the region. Moreover, he asserted that schools of fish inhabit the wide river area in Suzhou, and that it was possible to farm the lands created by landslides, since less tax is levied from such areas. This calls attention to the time when people took advantage of tides to supply water to the farmlands during the Qing Dynasty, 67 and shows how ideas surrounding hydraulics became more flexible compared to the Ming Dynasty. Another factor that played an important role in changing the perception of hydraulic facilities is deeply related to rice farming in the Jiangnan region at the time. There were two main varieties of rice in the Jiangnan region: indica rice (秈稻 Oryza indica) and japonica rice (秔稻, Oryza japonica). Indica rice produced a relatively large yield, had a high tolerance to drought, and grew well even in poor soil. However, it could not be preserved for a long period of time. On the other hand, japonica rice required fertile soil, and was used to pay taxes along with nonglutinous rice (粳米). Nonglutinous rice, in particular, was of high quality, usually found on the tables of the wealthy. 68 Among the three varieties, japonica rice and nonglutinous rice were a late-maturing variety, while indica rice was an early-maturing variety. In explaining the varieties of rice, however, Xu Guangqi stated that the late-maturing variety of rice is better for fertile lands, while less fertile land was suitable for the early-maturing variety. Moreover, he added that planting the early-maturing variety in fertile fields would not always be harmful, but planting the late-maturing variety in infertile fields would always fail. 69 This shows that even in poor soil, farmers planted more of the early-maturing variety, which was easier to grow. In other words, the interest in hydraulics was relatively low since it was difficult to build hydraulic facilities yet it was possible to grow rice on infertile lands. Another reason why farmers shied away from the imperative idea that hydraulic facilities were necessary for farming was due to the appearance of the so-called spring flowers (春花), which had been widely cultivated in the Jiangnan region in the late Ming Dynasty. Spring flowers referred to plants and crops such as colza and barley. In particular, there was no need for paddy fields to farm barley, and it was able to be harvested in the spring, when food was short. The impact of barley farming was significant, as evidenced by records of stabilized grain prices and procurement of half a year's food due to barley farming.
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Conclusion
Rice farming in paddies, which led agriculture for thousands of years and had been developed in the downstream region of the Yangzi River since the Song Dynasty, still remains the most essential means of agricultural production in China and a great driving force for supporting a massive population. Therefore, there is no need to add to the reason Chinese intellectuals and officials emphasized hydraulics as an important foundation for paddy-field farming. It was also not an exaggeration when certain scholars referred to China as a hydraulic society.
During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the Wusong River was the most important water system to the west of Lake Taihu, but its water flow had not been stable since the Song Dynasty. As a result, Chinese bureaucrats attempted to achieve the ideal of water control through series of dredging projects since the early Ming Dynasty. However, as a significant part of the area had already been turned into land, it was difficult to achieve an efficient flood control level through large-scale projects. In addition, high costs for these projects were a burden on national and regional levels. We can assume that an excessive amount of construction fees would have limited the movement of the nation and its officials. Therefore, since the sixteenth century, the direction of hydraulic policy was changed to focus on irrigation to handle transitory challenges.
In the Qing Dynasty, where socio-economic development was more predominant than the Ming Dynasty, we can see that hydraulics had been approached in a more flexible manner. It is true that even in the Qing Dynasty, large-scale projects were much larger than those were carried out in the Ming Dynasty. However, instead of pursuing grain production, which was dependent on hydraulic facilities, bureaucrats and intellectuals of the time attempted to break away from the pressure to work with hydraulic facilities, which had little room for improvement, by growing a variety of crops. In this aspect, commercial farming of a variety of crops and the development of the handicraft industry in the Ming and the Qing Dynasties was the result of ineffective hydraulic systems.
Meanwhile, it is quite interesting that the records of hydraulic engineering from this region during the Ming Dynasty and Collected Writings on Statecraft of the Ming Dynasty rarely mention hydraulic issues related to the cultivation of commercial crops. This is a temporary conclusion, as this study did not take into account the local gazetteers (地 方志) of the Ming Dynasty, which contain relatively more information. This paper attempts to explore the significance of the overall water control system and numerous water control projects in the Jiangnan region. Through a series of large-scale dredging projects, the Ming and Qing Dynasties attempted to achieve the goals of securing national tax revenue and guaranteeing the production activity for the farmers. However, due to the weakened hydraulic system, excessive expenses, and interests on various levels, large-scale hydraulic engineering projects were unable to achieve their original goals. Starting in the sixteenth century already, interests about practical one-time hydraulic engineering projects on a small scale began to surface.
Meanwhile, in the Qing Dynasty, when the socio-economic transformation developed more, a new awareness of hydraulics surfaced due to the expansion of commercial cultivation over a large amount of land in the Jiangnan region. This was the result of an attempt to break away from the heavy dependence on water control facilities that had little room for improvement by growing a variety of plants and crops instead of focusing solely on simple grain production. Therefore the cultivation of a variety of commercial crops and plants and the development of the handicraft industry in the Jiangnan region since the sixteenth century are two aspects of Chinese society that resulted from ineffective water control facilities.
However, despite these limitations and failures, large-scale hydraulic engineering projects were carried out repeatedly due to the economic importance of the Jiangnan region and to the efforts to achieve the ideals of flood control. 
